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Recurrent intervals of inattention to the stock market are optimal if consumers incur a utility cost to
observe asset values. When consumers observe the value of their wealth, they decide whether to transfer
funds between a transactions account from which consumption must be financed and an investment
portfolio of equity and riskless bonds. Transfers of funds are subject to a transactions cost that reduces
wealth and consists of two components: one is proportional to the amount of assets transferred, and
the other is a fixed resource cost. Because it is costly to transfer funds, the consumer may choose not
to transfer any funds on a particular observation date. In general, the optimal adjustment rule---including
the size and direction of transfers, and the time of the next observation---is state-dependent. Surprisingly,
unless the fixed resource cost of transferring funds is large, the consumer's optimal behavior eventually
evolves to a situation with a purely time-dependent rule with a constant interval of time between observations.
This interval of time can be substantial even for tiny observation costs. When this situation is attained,
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stavros.panageas@chicagobooth.eduA pervasive ﬁnding in studies of microeconomic choice is that adjustment to economic
news tends to be sluggish and infrequent. Investors rebalance their portfolios and revisit
their spending behavior at discrete and potentially infrequent points of time. Between these
times, inaction is the rule. If individuals take several months or even years to adjust their
portfolios and their spending plans, the standard predictions of the consumption smoothing
and portfolio choice theories might fail, and the standard intertemporal Euler equation re-
lating asset returns and consumption growth may not hold. Similar sorts of inaction also
characterize the ﬁnancing, investment, and pricing behavior of ﬁrms. These observations
have led economists to formulate models that are consistent with infrequent adjustment.1
Formal models of infrequent adjustment are often described as either time-dependent or
state-dependent. In time-dependent models, adjustment is triggered simply by calendar time.
In state-dependent models, adjustment takes place only when a particular state variable
reaches some trigger value, so the timing of adjustments depends on factors other than, or
in addition to, calendar time alone. A classic example of state-dependent adjustment is the
(S,s) model. The distinction between time-dependent and state-dependent models can have
crucial implications for important economic questions. For instance, monetary policy has
substantial real eﬀects that persist for several quarters if ﬁrms change their prices according
to a time-dependent rule. However, if ﬁrms adjust their prices according to a state-dependent
rule, then monetary policy may have little or no eﬀect on the real economy. (See e.g. Caplin
and Spulber (1987) and Golosov and Lucas (2007).)
In this paper we develop and analyze an optimizing model that can generate both
time-dependent adjustment and state-dependent adjustment. The economic context is an
inﬁnite-horizon continuous-time model of consumption and portfolio choice that builds on
the framework of Merton (1971). We augment Merton’s model by requiring consumption to
be purchased with the liquid asset and by introducing two sorts of costs – a utility cost of ob-
serving the value of the consumer’s wealth; and a resource cost of transferring assets between
a transactions account consisting of liquid assets and an investment portfolio consisting of
risky equity and riskless bonds. We motivate the utility cost of observing the value of wealth
as a reduction in leisure associated with obtaining and analyzing information.2 We model
the resource cost of transferring assets as the sum of two components: (1) a component that
is proportional to the amount of assets transferred; and (2) a component that is a homo-
geneous linear function of the balances in the transactions account and in the investment
portfolio. Since the second component is independent of the amount of assets transferred,
we refer to it as a ﬁxed resource cost of transferring assets.
1Because it is costly to observe the value of wealth, the consumer chooses to observe this
value only at discretely-spaced points in time. At these observation times, the consumer
chooses when next to observe the value of wealth, executes any transfers between the invest-
ment portfolio and the transactions account, and chooses the path of consumption until the
next observation date. During intervals of time between consecutive observations, optimal
behavior is characterized by inattention to the value of the consumer’s wealth, in particular,
to the value of equities.
In general, the timing of asset transfers is state-dependent. The relevant state of the
consumer’s balance sheet at time t is the ratio of the balance in the transactions account
to the contemporaneous value of the investment portfolio. We denote this ratio as xt.
The consumer may or may not transfer assets between the investment portfolio and the
transactions account on an observation date tj depending on the value of xtj. Because the
timing of asset transfers depends on the value of xtj, these transfers are state-dependent.
A surprising result of our analysis, however, is that, provided the ﬁxed resource cost of
transferring assets is not large, eventually an optimally inattentive consumer’s asset transfers
are purely time-dependent. Indeed, when asset holdings get to this stage, the optimal time
between successive asset transfers is constant.
When the consumer has relatively large holdings in the transactions account on an obser-
vation date, he will transfer some of these assets to the investment portfolio. Alternatively,
when the consumer’s holdings in the transactions account are low on an observation date, he
will sell some assets from the investment portfolio to replenish the transactions account in
order to ﬁnance consumption until the next observation date. However, when the transac-
tions account has an intermediate balance, measured by an intermediate value of xtj on an
observation date, the consumer will not ﬁnd it worthwhile to pay the costs associated with
transferring assets between the investment portfolio and the transactions account. We show
that eventually optimal behavior by a consumer facing observation costs leads to a low value
of xtj on an observation date. Once a low value of xtj is realized on an observation date, the
consumer transfers only enough assets to the transactions account to ﬁnance consumption
until the next observation date, provided that the ﬁxed resource cost of transferring assets
is not too large. This behavior is optimal because it is costly to transfer assets, and the
liquid asset in the transactions account earns a lower rate of return than the riskless bond
in the investment portfolio. In this case, the consumer plans to hold a zero balance in the
transactions account on the next observation date, so that xtj will equal zero on the next
observation date. Thus, on the next observation date, xtj will again have a low value and
2the situation repeats itself.
This paper is related to two strands of literature. The ﬁrst strand is the large literature
on transactions costs. In Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956), which are the forerunners of the
cash-in-advance model used in macroeconomics, consumers can hold two riskless assets that
pay diﬀerent rates of return: money, which pays zero interest, and a riskless bond that pays
a positive rate of interest. As in our paper, consumers are willing to hold money, despite
the fact that its rate of return is dominated by the rate of return on riskless bonds, because
goods have to be purchased with money. That is, money oﬀers liquidity services.
A more recent literature on portfolio transactions costs, including Constantinides (1986)
and Davis and Norman (1990), models the cost of transferring assets between stocks and
bonds in the investment portfolio as proportional to the size of the transfers. Here we
also include proportional transactions costs, but these costs apply only to transfers between
the liquid asset in the transactions account on the one hand and the investment portfolio
of stocks and bonds on the other. We do not model the costs of reallocating stocks and
bonds within the investment portfolio. For a retired consumer who ﬁnances consumption by
withdrawing assets from a tax-deferred retirement account, the cost of withdrawing assets
from the investment portfolio includes taxes paid at the time of withdrawal. For most
consumers in this situation, the marginal tax rate, which is part of the cost of transferring
assets from the investment portfolio to the transactions account, is likely to be far greater
than any costs associated with reallocating stocks and bonds within the investment portfolio.
A second strand of the literature analyzes the infrequent adjustment of choice variables
that arises because it is costly to observe and process information. This strand of litera-
ture itself has proceeded in two directions. One direction, which includes Sims (2003) and
Moscarini (2004), uses the information-theoretic concept of entropy in a linear-quadratic
framework to model rational inattention as the outcome of the limited ability of people to
process information. In those papers, the decisionmaker generally receives noisy information
about important state variables and can choose the timing and information content of these
signals.3
The other direction pursued in the literature on infrequent adjustment does not build on
directly on entropy, but instead, speciﬁes costs of obtaining and processing information. The
two closest antecedents to our current paper4 are Duﬃe and Sun (1990) and Abel, Eberly,
and Panageas (2007).5 These papers, as well as the current paper require consumption to
be purchased with a liquid asset, such as cash. In addition, because these papers include an
observation cost, the consumer will not continuously observe the value of the stock market.
3In our current paper, we show that when xtj is low, the consumer will plan to arrive at
the next observation date with a zero balance in the transactions account, and that the
length of time between subsequent observations is constant if the ﬁxed cost of transferring
assets is suﬃciently small. Duﬃe and Sun derive inattention intervals of constant length,
but they implicitly conﬁne attention to low values of xtj by explicitly assuming that xtj = 0
on the ﬁrst observation date. Here we show that optimal behavior is potentially diﬀerent for
intermediate and high values of xtj—situations not considered by Duﬃe and Sun. Moreover,
we show conditions under which eventually xtj will indeed become low on an observation date
and optimal behavior converges to time-dependence. In this sense, Duﬃe and Sun conﬁne
attention to the long run for the case with low ﬁxed costs of transferring assets, while we
consider the transition path to the long run and long-run behavior, as well as the conditions
necessary for this absorption to occur. Importantly, consideration of behavior outside of the
long-run situation allows the model to incorporate state-dependent adjustment as well as
purely time-dependent adjustment. In addition, we also oﬀer a quantitative assessment of
the length of the interval of time between consecutive observations in the long run. Finally,
relative to our own earlier paper, the current paper explicitly allows separate consideration
of observation costs and transactions costs and models the observation cost as a utility cost
rather than a resource cost.6,7
Section 1 sets up the consumer’s decision problem. Section 2 characterizes the optimal
trigger and return values for the state variable xt. In addition, this section contains a detailed
discussion of a typical indiﬀerence curve of the value function to illustrate various aspects of
optimal adjustment behavior. The dynamic evolution of xt is analyzed in Section 3, which
also characterizes the long-run situation that is eventually attained if the ﬁxed component of
transactions costs is suﬃciently small. In addition, Section 3 presents a numerical illustration
of the constant length of time between consecutive observations in the long run, followed by
a discussion of the Euler equation. Section 4 concludes. The Appendix contains proofs of
various results.
1 Consumer’s Decision Problem
Consider an inﬁnitely-lived consumer who does not earn any labor income but has wealth
that consists of risky equity, riskless bonds, and a riskless liquid asset. Consumption must be
purchased with the liquid asset, which the consumer holds in a transactions account. Risky
equity and riskless bonds are held in an investment portfolio and cannot be used directly
4to purchase consumption. The consumer is not permitted to take either a leveraged or a
negative position in equity.
1.1 Asset Returns




= µdt + σdz, (1)
where µ > 0 is the mean rate of return and σ is the instantaneous standard deviation. The
riskless bond in the investment portfolio has a constant instantaneous rate of return rf that
is positive and less than the mean rate of return on equity, so 0 < rf < µ. The total value
of the investment portfolio, consisting of equity and riskless bonds, is St at time t.
At time t, the consumer holds Xt in the liquid asset, which pays a riskless instantaneous
rate of return rL, where rL < rf. The rate of return on the liquid asset, rL, is lower than the
rate of return on the riskless bond in the investment portfolio, rf, because the liquid asset
provides transactions services not provided by the bond in the investment portfolio.
Suppose the consumer observes the value of the investment portfolio at time tj and next
observes its value at time tj+1 = tj + τj. Immediately upon observing the values of Stj
and Xtj,8 the consumer may transfer assets between the investment portfolio and the liquid
asset in the transactions account (at a cost described below) so that at time t
+
j the value of
the investment portfolio is St
+
j . The consumer chooses to hold a fraction φj of St
+
j in risky
equity and a fraction 1−φj in riskless bonds and does not rebalance the investment portfolio
before the next observation.9 Since the consumer cannot take a negative position in equity
and cannot take a leveraged position in equity, we have 0 ≤ φj ≤ 1. When the consumer








+ (1 − φj)e
rfτj (3)
is the gross rate of return on the investment portfolio over the j −th interval of time, which
extends from t
+
j to tj+1 = tj + τj.
51.2 Costs of Transferring Assets
The consumer can transfer assets between the investment portfolio and the transactions
account by incurring a resource cost that is proportional to the size of the transfer and
a “ﬁxed” resource cost that is independent of the size of the asset transfer. Speciﬁcally,
if the consumer sells −ys ≥ 0 dollars of assets from the investment portfolio, there is a
proportional transfer cost of −ψsys dollars, where 0 ≤ ψs < 1, so that a sale of −ys dollars
from the investment portfolio is accompanied by an increase in X of −(1 − ψs)ys dollars.
For transfers in the other direction, in which the consumer uses the transactions account
to buy additional assets in the investment portfolio, a purchase of yb ≥ 0 dollars in the
investment portfolio is accompanied by a decrease in X of (1 + ψb)yb dollars, where ψb ≥ 0.
We assume that ψs+ψb > 0 so that at least one of the proportional transfer cost parameters
is positive. Perhaps the most obvious interpretation of the proportional transactions costs,
ψs and ψb, is that they represent brokerage fees. Another interpretation presents itself if we
consider the investment portfolio to be a tax-deferred account such as a 401k account. In
this case, the consumer must pay a tax on withdrawals from the investment portfolio, and
ψs would include the consumer’s income tax rate, which would be substantially higher than
a brokerage fee.10
The ﬁxed resource cost is independent of the size of the asset transfer but is a linear
function of the amounts of assets held in the transactions account and in the investment
portfolio. Speciﬁcally, the ﬁxed resource cost is θXX + θSS, where 0 ≤ θX << 1 and
0 ≤ θS < 1 − ψs.11 We assume that θXX is paid from the transactions account and θSS is
paid from the investment portfolio. Of course, if θX = θS, the ﬁxed resource cost is simply






as the ratio of the transactions account to the investment portfolio. It will be convenient to
calculate the change in S that accompanies a given change in x when the consumer transfers
assets between the investment portfolio and the transactions account. Speciﬁcally, suppose




, so that xtj = Xtj/Stj. If
the consumer buys yb ≥ 0 dollars of assets in the investment portfolio or sells −ys ≥ 0 dollars



















Xtj − (1 + ψb)y
















where 1{yb>0} is an indicator function that equals 1 if yb > 0 and equals 0 otherwise, and
1{ys<0} is an indicator function that equals 1 if ys < 0 and equals 0 otherwise. Use equations

























j + (1 + ψb)1{yb>0} + (1 − ψs)1{ys<0}
.
(7)
1.3 The Utility Function
1.3.1 Consumption between Observation Dates
Suppose that the consumer observes the value of the investment portfolio only at discretely-
spaced points in time t0,t1,t2,.... At observation date tj, after observing the value of the
















where ct is consumption at time t, Ai is the utility cost of observing the investment portfolio







We will specify the observation cost Ai more precisely in subsection 1.3.2. For now, treat
Ai as exogenous.
Once the consumer observes the value of assets at date tj, he will not observe any new
information until the next observation date, tj+1. Therefore, at time tj, the consumer can
plan the entire path of consumption from time t
+
j to time tj+1 . Let C (tj,τj) be the present
value, discounted at rate rL, of the ﬂow of consumption over the interval of time from t
+
j








where the path of consumption cs, t
+
j ≤ s ≤ tj+1, is chosen to maximize the discounted value
of utility over the interval from t
+
j to tj+1. Let















7subject to a given value of C (tj,τj) in equation (10). Since the consumer does not observe
any new information between time t
+
j and time tj+1, the maximization in equation (11) is a
standard intertemporal optimization under certainty. It is straightforward to show that14


























and we assume that
ω ≡
ρ − (1 − α)rL
α
> 0. (16)
Since all of the consumption during the interval of time from t
+
j to tj+1 is ﬁnanced from
the liquid asset in the transactions account, which earns an instantaneous riskless rate of






j − C (tj,τj)
￿
. (17)
1.3.2 Cost of Observing the Value of the Investment Portfolio
Now we specify the observation cost Ai in more detail. We motivate the speciﬁcation of Ai
by thinking of the observation cost as foregone leisure and building on a utility formulation
widely used in the real business cycle and growth literatures. Speciﬁcally, in those literatures,
instantaneous utility at time t is speciﬁed as u(ct,lt) = 1
1−αc
1−α
t υ(lt), where ct is the ﬂow
of consumption at time t and lt is the ﬂow of leisure at time t.15 If we were to adopt this
formulation directly, we would specify υ(lt) = 1 at times that the consumer does not observe
the value of the investment portfolio and υ(lt) = 1−(1 − α)θ1, θ1 > 0, at observation times
tj, reducing instantaneous utility by a multiplicative factor at observation times. Speciﬁcally,
the utility cost of observing the investment portfolio at time tj+1 would be Aj+1 = θ1c
1−α
tj+1.
However, if the observation cost were speciﬁed in this way, an optimizing consumer would
plan a discontinuous jump in consumption at time tj+1 in order to reduce the observation
cost. We regard this planned discontinuity in the path of consumption in the absence of new
information as an unattractive feature. Therefore, we adopt an alternative speciﬁcation of
the observation cost that avoids this problem but yields the same value of the observation
cost. Speciﬁcally, suppose that immediately after observing the value of the investment
8portfolio at time tj, the consumer chooses the path of consumption from t
+
j to tj+1 ignoring
any eﬀect of consumption on the observation cost Aj+1. In this case, the standard Euler
equation for a deterministic intertemporal consumption problem implies (see equation * in
footnote 14) that ctj+1 = e−
ρ−rL
α τjct+




















Substitute equation (19) into equation (18), multiply both sides of the resulting equation by
e−ρτj, and use the deﬁnition of h(τ) in equation to (15) to obtain the present value of Aj+1
discounted back to time tj
e




We adopt equation (20) as the fundamental expression for the discounted value of the
observation cost Aj+1. Because Aj+1 is proportional to the integral of utility from consump-
tion over the interval (tj,tj+1], it does not distort the path of consumption over this interval.
In particular, an optimizing consumer will plan to have a continuous path of consumption
over this entire interval.
Use equation (20) and the expression for lifetime utility in (8) to obtain the value function
at observation date tj. The value function, immediately after observing the value of the









θ1 (1 − α)
eωτjh(τj)
￿
















where βτj ≡ e−ρτj and the maximization in equation (21) is subject to equations (5) and (6)
and the inequality constraints C (tj,τj) ≤ Xt+
j , 0 ≤ φj ≤ 1, yb ≥ 0, and ys ≤ 0.
The value function in equation (21) is homogeneous of degree 1 − α in Xtj and Stj, and
consequently the optimal length of time between consecutive observations, τj, is a function


































in equation (22) can be used to rewrite the marginal rate of












￿ − xtj. (24)
2 Trigger and Return Values of x
The value of xtj ≡
Xtj
Stj on an observation date tj determines whether, and in which direction,
the consumer transfers any assets between the investment portfolio and the transactions
account. There are two trigger values of x, ω1 and ω2, that determine whether the consumer
transfers assets, and there are two return values of x, π1 and π2, that characterize the optimal
value of xt+
j immediately after a transfer.
To deﬁne and characterize the trigger values, ω1 and ω2, we ﬁrst deﬁne the restricted




at observation date tj as the maximized expected value of utility
over the inﬁnite future, subject to the restriction that the consumer does not transfer any
assets between the transactions account and the investment portfolio at time tj (but optimally










θ1 (1 − α)
eωτjh(τj)
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subject to C (tj,τj) ≤ Xt
+
j and 0 ≤ φj ≤ 1. For the remainder of this section, we will sup-
press the time subscripts, with the understanding that the results apply at any observation
date.
Like the value function, the restricted value function is homogeneous of degree 1−α and
can be written as





On any observation date, e V (X,S) ≤ V (X,S), with equality only if the optimal values of yb
and ys are both zero.
10Deﬁne
ω1 ≡ inf x > 0 : e v(x) = v (x) (27)
and
ω2 ≡ supx > 0 : e v(x) = v(x). (28)
The proposition below shows that ω1 and ω2 are trigger values for x in the sense that if x
is less than ω1 on an observation date, the consumer will transfer assets to the transactions
account, and if x exceeds ω2 on an observation date, the consumer will transfer assets to
the investment portfolio. To ensure that ω2 is ﬁnite, we assume that θX is not too large.
Speciﬁcally, we assume
θX < θX ≡ (1 + ν)
−1 ￿
1 + ν









where ν ≡ ω
rf−rL > 0. We also deﬁne
π1 ≡ sup
(





, (1) V (xS,S) ≥ V (xS − (1 − ψs)z,S + z)






x ≥ 0 : ∀z ∈ (0,S], (1) V (xS,S) ≥ V (xS + (1 + ψb)z,S − z)
and (2) V (xS,S) > e V (xS + (1 + ψb)z,S − z)
)
. (31)
The proposition below shows that π1 and π2 are the return values for x. Speciﬁcally,
if x ≤ ω1, the consumer will transfer enough assets from the investment portfolio to the
transactions account to increase x to π1. Alternatively, if x ≥ ω2, the consumer will use the
transactions account to buy enough assets in the investment portfolio to decrease x to π2.
Proposition 1 1. 0 < ω1 ≤ π1 ≤ π2 ≤ ω2 < ∞.
2. If xtj < ω1, then



























4. If xtj > ω2, then



























Proposition 1 is proved in the appendix. Here we use the indiﬀerence curves in Figure
1 to illustrate this proposition and the deﬁnitions of the trigger and return points. For
simplicity, Figure 1 is drawn for the case in which θX = θS. The indiﬀerence curve of the
value function V (X,S) passes through points A, B, C, D, E, and F, and the indiﬀerence
curve of the restricted value function e V (X,S) passes through points K, B, C, D, E, and J.
In Regions II, III, and IV, the two indiﬀerence curves are identical so that the marginal rate
of substitution between X and S is the same for both the value function and the restricted
value function. In addition, V (X,S) = e V (X,S) in these regions so that the maximized
value of expected lifetime utility is obtained by the restricted value function, which assumes
that the consumer does not transfer any assets between the investment portfolio and the
transactions account on the current observation date. Therefore, Regions II, III, and IV
represent the ”inaction region” in which the consumer optimally chooses not to transfer
assets between the investment portfolio and the transactions account.
The consumer will transfer assets if V (X,S) > e V (X,S), which is the case in Regions I
and V. For instance, in Region I, the indiﬀerence curve of the restricted value function passes
through point B and lies above the indiﬀerence curve of the value function that also passes
through point B, thereby implying that V (X,S) > e V (X,S) in this region.16 In order to
attain the maximized value of expected lifetime utility, the consumer must transfer assets
between the investment portfolio and the transactions account. As shown in statement
2a of Proposition 1, ys < 0 so the consumer sells assets from the investment portfolio to
increase the amount of liquid assets in the transactions account. Similarly, according to
statement 4a, if the consumer is in Region V on an observation date, the optimal policy is
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Figure 1: Indiﬀerence Curve of the Value Function When θX = θS.
Now consider the return value π1. We proceed in two steps. First, assume that the
consumer has already paid the ﬁxed transfer cost θ2 (X + S), where θ2 is the common value of
θX = θS, and that the consumer is choosing the size of the asset transfer from the investment
portfolio to the transactions account. In the second step, we consider the impact of the
ﬁxed transfer cost, θ2 (X + S), on the optimal transfer.
Suppose that, after paying the ﬁxed cost θ2 (X + S), the consumer is located somewhere
to the right of point C along the dashed line through point C with slope −(1 − ψs). For
instance, suppose that the consumer is at point A′. Having already paid the ﬁxed cost,
the consumer can move instantaneously to any point up and to the left of point A′ along
the dashed line with slope −(1 − ψs) by reducing S by −ys > 0 dollars and increasing
X by (1 − ψs)(−ys) dollars. The consumer will sell assets from the investment portfolio,
until (X,S) reaches point C, where the dashed line with slope −(1 − ψs) is tangent to the
indiﬀerence curve, which is essentially a smooth-pasting condition. At point C, the ratio of
X to S, i.e., x, is equal to π1, as indicated by the line through points O, C, and G, which
has slope equal to π1.
Now let’s consider the impact of the ﬁxed cost θ2 (X + S) on the optimal transfer of
assets. If θ2 > 0, the consumer cannot move from point A′ to point C. To see the impact
13of θ2 > 0, consider the line through points G, B, and A, which is parallel to the line through
points C, B′, and A′, and hence has slope −(1 − ψs). Point G lies on the half-line through
the origin with slope π1 and is located so that the length of OC is 1 − θ2 times the length
of OG. The properties of similar triangles imply that the length of OB′ is 1 − θ2 times the
length of OB and that the length of OA′ is 1 − θ2 times the length of OA.
Now suppose that the consumer starts at point A and sells −ys > 0 dollars from the
investment portfolio, thereby incurring a cost of θ2 (X + S) − ψsys dollars. The ﬁxed cost
of θ2 (X + S) dollars reduces both X and S by the fraction θ2 and can be represented by
the movement from point A to point A′; the sale of −ys > 0 dollars from the investment
portfolio can be represented by a movement from point A′ upward and leftward along the
dashed line through points C, B′, and A′. The consumer will be willing to move from A to
point C only if doing so increases (or at least does not lower) the value of the value function.
That is, the gain in value from moving to an improved allocation between X and S, with
x = π1, must outweigh the ﬁxed cost θ2 (X + S) represented by the movement downward
and leftward from the line through points G, B, and A to the line through points C, B′, and
A′. For a large change in the ratio x, such as the change in moving from point A to point C,
the net gain in value is positive. For a small change in x, the change is not worthwhile. At
point B, the gain from the improved allocation between X and S is exactly oﬀset by the cost
of moving from the line through points G, B, and A to the line through points C, B′, and
A′. Formally, this equality of gain and beneﬁt is represented by statement 3 in Proposition
1, which is essentially a value-matching condition.
For points along the segment GB, the change in the value of x is small enough that the
improved allocation between X and S is outweighed by the ﬁxed cost θ2 (X + S). Therefore,
the consumer will not transfer assets from any points along this segment. The fact that the
consumer will not move from points along segment GB to point C is illustrated by the fact
that these points lie above the indiﬀerence curve of the value function that passes through
point C. Alternatively, for points below and to the right of point B along the line through
points A and B, the improved asset allocation made possible by moving to point C, and the
associated increase in value, are large enough to compensate for the ﬁxed transfer cost, and
the consumer will move from any of these points to C (statements 2a and 2b). Since the
consumer ends up at the same point, namely point C, from any point below and to the right
of point B, all of these points have the same value. Thus, all of these points lie on the same
indiﬀerence curve (statement 2d), so that indiﬀerence curve has slope equal to −(1 − ψs)
below and to the right of point B, which is statement 2c in Proposition 1.17
We have used Figure 1 to illustrate the trigger point ω1 and the return point π1 when the
14consumer chooses to sell assets from investment portfolio. A similar set of arguments can
explain the trigger point ω2 and the return point π2 when the consumer chooses to use some
of the liquid assets in the transactions account to buy assets in the investment portfolio.
We conclude this section with the following corollary to Proposition 1.
Corollary 1 ω1 ≤ xt
+
j ≤ ω2.
This corollary states that the value of xt immediately following any observation date
tj (and following any optimal asset transfers at date t
+
j ) is conﬁned to the closed interval
[ω1,ω2]. This result will be useful when we analyze the dynamic behavior of asset holdings
in the next section.
3 Dynamic Behavior
We have shown that the direction of the optimal transfer on an observation date depends
on the value of xtj. In this section, we examine the dynamic behavior of X and S between
observation dates. Because no new information arrives between observation dates and the
rate of return on the transactions account is riskless, the evolution of X between observation
dates is deterministic. By contrast, the value of the investment portfolio evolves stochas-
tically over time. If the value of X is positive on the subsequent observation date, then,
depending on the outcome of the stochastic process for S, the consumer potentially could be
in any of the ﬁve regions on the next observation date. However, if θX and θS are suﬃciently
small, the stochastic process for xtj will eventually be absorbed at xtj = 0.
Proposition 2 For suﬃciently small values of θX ≥ 0 and θS ≥ 0, if xtj < ω1 on observa-
tion date tj, then xtk = 0 on all subsequent observation dates tk > tj.
The proof of Proposition 2 is in the Appendix. Here we provide an intuitive argument.
First, consider the case in which θX = θS = 0. If xtj < ω1 on observation date tj, the optimal
transfer is to sell assets from the investment portfolio to increase the transactions account
so that xt+
j increases to π1. Since each additional dollar that is sold from the investment
portfolio incurs a transactions cost ψs, and since the transactions account earns a lower
riskless rate of return than the riskless rate of return on bonds in the investment portfolio,
the consumer would never sell more assets from investment portfolio than are needed to
ﬁnance consumption until the next observation date. Thus, the consumer will arrive at the
next observation date with zero liquid assets, so that xtj+1 will be zero. Since xtj+1 = 0 < ω1,
15the process will repeat itself ad inﬁnitum with xtk = 0 on every observation date tk > tj and
xt
+
k = π1 immediately after every future observation date.
If θX and θS are positive, then we need to consider the possibility that the consumer would
want to arrive at the next observation date with enough liquid assets in the transactions
account to avoid transferring assets from the investment portfolio and thus avoid paying the
ﬁxed transactions cost at that date. As we prove in the Appendix, if θX and θS are small
enough, the consumer will still optimally choose to arrive at the next observation date with
a zero balance in the transactions account, even though this action necessitates payment of
the ﬁxed transaction cost at the next observation date.
The following lemma together with Proposition 2 allows us to prove that the stochas-
tic process for xtj is eventually absorbed at zero, if the ﬁxed cost of transferring assets is
suﬃciently small.
Lemma 1 Eventually, xtj < ω1 on an observation date.
The proof of Lemma 1 is in the Appendix. Here we provide an intuitive argument.
Because the expected rate of return on equity, µ, exceeds the riskless rate of return, rf, on
bonds in the investment portfolio, the optimal share of equity, φj, is positive (see Lemma 4).












will be less than ω1. Eventually, this event will occur.
Proposition 3 For suﬃciently small values of θX ≥ 0 and θS ≥ 0, the stochastic process
for xtj is eventually absorbed at zero.
Proof. Lemma 1 states that eventually xtj < ω1 on an observation date. Proposition
2 implies that when this event occurs, xtj+1 = 0 on the next observation date and on all
subsequent observation dates, provided that θX ≥ 0 and θS ≥ 0 are suﬃciently small.
Corollary 2 For suﬃciently small θX ≥ 0 and θS ≥ 0, in the long run: (a) xtj = 0 on
every observation date and (b) the consumer sells assets from the investment portfolio so
that xt
+
j = π1 immediately after every observation date.
Proposition 3 and its corollary imply that, provided the ﬁxed transaction cost parameters
θX and θS are suﬃciently small, the consumer will eventually reach a repeating pattern in
which a constant amount of time elapses between consecutive observations of the stock
market. The consumer will arrive at each observation date having just exhausted the liquid
16(1) (2) (3) (4)
Observation cost τ∗,θ2 = 0 θ∗
2 × 106 τ∗,θ2 = θ∗
2
(dollar equivalent) (years) (dollar equivalent) (years)
Baseline 2.3 0.096 6.6 0.191
θ1 = 0.001 23.3 0.308 63.0 0.590
ρ = 0.02 2.6 0.097 7.4 0.193
α = 3 2.3 0.092 6.1 0.176
rL = 0 2.3 0.079 11.4 0.195
rf = 0.03 2.8 0.084 27.0 0.279
µ = 0.07 2.6 0.088 6.1 0.161
σ = 0.2 2.1 0.096 6.3 0.198
Table 1: θ∗
2 is the largest value of θ2 = θX = θS that leads to constant optimal inattention spans.
Baseline Parameters: α = 4,ρ = 0.01,rL = 0.01,rf = 0.02,µ = 0.06,σ = 0.16, θ1 = 0.0001.
assets in the transactions account and will liquidate just enough assets from the investment
portfolio to ﬁnance consumption until the next observation date. Thus, the consumer’s
behavior has a Baumol-Tobin ﬂavor to it. The model in Duﬃe and Sun (1990) shares this
property because it assumes that the consumer starts with xt = 0. Our results are also
consistent with Duﬃe and Sun, despite some diﬀerences in the details of modeling of the
observation costs and the ﬁxed component of transfer costs.
Proposition 3 and its corollary are remarkable because they imply that even though the
choices of observation dates and transactions dates follow state-dependent rules in general,
they will eventually converge to pure time-dependent rules, provided that the ﬁxed transac-
tions costs are small. Table 1 presents the optimal time between consecutive observation
dates in the long run for the case in which θX = θS = θ2 for the baseline parameter values
reported in the table’s caption. To present the observation cost and the ﬁxed component
of the transactions cost in terms of dollars, we assume that the consumer has $1 million in
the investment portfolio on an observation date. The observation cost in column (1) is the
dollar equivalent of the reduction in utility associated with the observation cost.18 In the
baseline case, the observation cost is $2.30 per observation. Column (2) reports the optimal
time between consecutive observations when θ2 = 0 so that ﬁxed cost parameters θX and
θS are both zero. The time between observations is measured in years, so in the baseline
case, the optimal time between observations is slightly longer than one month. Column
(3) reports θ∗
2, which is the largest value of θX = θS = θ2 that is small enough to ensure
that eventually the time between consecutive observations is constant. The values reported
in column (3) are actually θ∗
2 × 106 so that, for instance, in the baseline case, the ﬁxed
17transactions cost is $6.60 for a millionaire. Finally, column (4) reports the time between
consecutive observations when θ2 = θ∗
2.
Table 1 allows us to draw two broad conclusions. First, even tiny observation costs can
lead to substantial inattention intervals. Column (2) shows that even when the ﬁxed costs of
transacting are zero (θX = θS = 0), a consumer who owns one million dollars, and incurs an
observation cost equivalent to about two dollars, will observe her portfolio at approximately
a monthly frequency. Second, ﬁxed transaction costs can signiﬁcantly magnify the eﬀect of
observation costs to produce even larger inattention spans. The inattention spans in column
(4) are about twice as large as the inattention spans in column (2). Intuitively, when ﬁxed
transaction costs are not too large compared to the observation costs, the consumer will ﬁnd
it optimal to synchronize transaction and observation dates, in order to avoid “wasting” ob-
servation costs without using the obtained information to undertake a transaction. Because
of this synchronization, the optimal inattention interval is determined as if ﬁxed transaction
costs and observation costs are bundled together, eﬀectively magnifying the impact of the
observation cost. For instance, with an observation cost of $2.30, the optimal time between
observations can be more than two months, if θ2 = θ∗
2.
The calculations reported in Table 1 are invariant to the proportional transaction cost
parameters ψb and ψs. The irrelevance of ψb results from the fact that in the long run the
consumer does not ever transfer any assets from the transactions account to the investment
portfolio and thus never incurs any cost ψbyb. The proposition below implies that ψs is also
irrelevant for calculating the optimal time between observations in the long run when θX
and θS are suﬃciently small.




as the value function, for a given value of the transac-








, and deﬁne π1 (ψs)
as the optimal return value of xt
+
j for xtj < ω1. Suppose that θX and θS are suﬃciently
small that for any admissible value of ψs, if xtj < ω1 on observation date tj, then on all










2. the optimal observation dates tk = tj + (k − j)τ∗, for k ≥ j, are invariant to ψs
3. π1 (ψs) = (1 − ψs)π1 (0).
The proof of this proposition is in the Appendix. The intuitive argument underlying
this proposition is that when Xtj = 0 on an observation date, so that all of the consumer’s
18wealth is in the investment portfolio, Stj, the consumer can only pay for future consumption
by selling assets from the investment portfolio and incurring the proportional transaction cost
ψs. In eﬀect, ψs is a pure consumption tax that does not distort the intertemporal proﬁle
of consumption; it simply shifts the entire proﬁle of consumption downward by a fraction
ψs, thereby multiplying lifetime utility by (1 − ψs)
1−α, which is statement 1 of Proposition
4. The value of ψs does not aﬀect the timing of observations and transactions in the long
run (statement 2 of Proposition 4), nor does it aﬀect the amount of assets transferred out
of the investment portfolio. However, because each dollar transferred out of the investment
portfolio yields only 1 − ψs dollars of liquid assets, xt
+
j = π1 (ψs) = (1 − ψs)π1 (0), which is
statement 3 of Proposition 4.
Optimal consumption and transfers of assets imply an Euler equation relating the in-
tertemporal marginal rate of substitution and excess returns on equity between two obser-
vation dates.19 We prove the following proposition in the Appendix.
Proposition 5 If θX and θS are suﬃciently small, and α >
µ−rf













Proposition 5 states that if the ﬁxed transactions costs, parameterized by θX and θS, are
suﬃciently small, then for suﬃciently risk-averse consumers, the relevant Euler equation in
the long run is the same as the standard Euler equation, provided that attention is conﬁned
to observation dates.20
4 Concluding Remarks
Rules governing infrequent adjustment are typically categorized as time-dependent or state-
dependent. Time-dependent rules depend only on calendar time and can optimally result
from costs of gathering and processing information. State-dependent rules depend on the
value of some state variable, typically reaching some trigger threshold, and can be the op-
timal response to a transactions cost. Our model combines costly information and costly
transactions. In general, on any observation date, the consumer chooses the length of time
until the next date at which to gather information and re-optimize, but that length of time
may be state-dependent. Moreover, conditional on the information observed at that future
date, the agent’s action (or lack thereof) may also be state-dependent. Thus, the model has
elements of both state- and time-dependent rules in general.
In the long run, however, the optimal behavior converges to a rule that is purely time-
dependent, provided that the ﬁxed component of the transfer costs is suﬃciently small.
19Once the consumer arrives at an observation date with a suﬃciently small balance in the
transactions account, he will optimally choose to arrive at all subsequent observation dates
with zero liquid assets in the transactions account. In our model, this behavior results
from the facts that (1) the consumer can save on costs by synchronizing observation and
transactions dates and (2) the consumer would prefer to hold as little as possible of his
wealth in the liquid asset because the return on the transactions account is dominated by
the return on the investment account.
We have emphasized the tendency toward pure time-dependence in our model, but there
are forces that could prevent this situation from arising, even within the model. If the ﬁxed
component of the transactions cost is large, then our proof that the consumer will choose
to arrive at the next observation date with zero liquid assets no longer holds. And if the
consumer arrives at an observation date with a positive amount of liquid assets, then the
state variable xt could potentially take on any positive value, and a purely time-dependent
rule would not be optimal even in the long run. Outside the model, one might consider
allowing for the arrival of labor income in the transactions account or the occurrence of
attention-grabbing events that occur when the consumer is not at a planned observation
date.21
Even though such modiﬁcations undermine convergence to a purely time-dependent rule,
the fundamental forces driving this result still seem to create a tendency to exhaust (or keep
a very low balance in) the liquid account: the transactions account is dominated in rate of
return, and synchronizing observations and transactions reduces costs. Therefore, the con-
sumer would routinely ﬁnd himself in region I in the long run and would repeatedly transfer
enough assets from the investment account to arrive at x
+
tj = π1. Since the inattention span
τ is a function of x
+
tj, the distributions of inattention intervals would have a point mass at
τ (π1). In the special case of a purely time-dependent rule, that point mass is equal to one.
20A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. We start by proving the following Lemma.
Lemma 2 Optimal behavior requires ysyb = 0. If the optimal asset transfer increases x, then
ys < 0. If the optimal transfer decreases x, then yb > 0.
Proof of Lemma 2. To prove that ysyb = 0, suppose ysyb  = 0, which implies that ys < 0
and yb > 0. Now consider reducing yb by ε and increasing ys by ε, which will have no eﬀect on
the value of S relative to the original transfer but will increase X by (ψs + ψb)ε relative to the
original transfer by reducing the amount of proportional transactions cost incurred. Therefore, it
could not have been optimal for ysyb  = 0. Hence, ysyb = 0.
The value function V (X,S) is strictly increasing in X and S, so an optimal transfer will never
decrease both X and S. Therefore, if the optimal transfer increases x ≡ X
S , then the optimal
transfer cannot decrease X and must decrease S, which implies that yb = 0 and ys > 0. Similarly,
if the optimal transfer decreases x ≡ X
S , then the optimal transfer cannot decrease S and must
decrease X, which implies that ys = 0 and yb > 0.
Proof of statement 2a. Suppose that x < ω1. The deﬁnition of ω1 in equation (27) implies
that v (x)  = e v (x). The optimal asset transfer will change the value of x to some value z for which
v(z) = e v (z). The deﬁnition of ω1 implies that such a z cannot be less than ω1, so the optimal
transfer increases x. Lemma 2 implies that ys < 0.
Proof of statement 2b. Start from (X0,S0) where X0 < ω1S0. Statement 2a implies that
optimal ys < 0. Let ys be the optimal value of ys. Therefore,
V ((1 − θX)X0 − (1 − ψs)ys,(1 − θS)S0 + ys) = e V ((1 − θX)X0 − (1 − ψs)ys,(1 − θS)S0 + ys)
(A.1)
and
V ((1 − θX)X0 − (1 − ψs)ys,(1 − θS)S0 + ys) (A.2)
≥ V ((1 − θX)X0 − (1 − ψs)(ys − ζ),(1 − θS)S0 + ys − ζ),
for ζ ∈ [0,(1 − θS)S0 + ys].
Deﬁne ys∗ as the value of ys that will lead to x0+ = π1. Use equation (7) to show that
ys∗ = S0+ − (1 − θS)S0 =
￿
(1 − θX)x0 − (1 − θS)π1
π1 + 1 − ψs
￿
S0.
From this point onward, the proof proceeds by contradiction. Assume ys > ys∗ so that the
magnitude of the transfer ys is smaller than the transfer needed to increase x0+ to π1. Since ys is
21optimal, equations (A.1) and (A.2) imply that
(A.3)
e V ((1 − θX)X0 − (1 − ψs)ys,(1 − θS)S0 + ys) = V ((1 − θX)X0 − (1 − ψs)ys,(1 − θS)S0 + ys)
≥ V ((1 − θX)X0 − (1 − ψs)ys∗,(1 − θS)S0 + ys∗)
But deﬁnition of π1 implies that
e V ((1 − θX)X0 − (1 − ψs)ys,(1 − θS)S0 + ys) < V ((1 − θX)X0 − (1 − ψs)ys∗,(1 − θS)S0 + ys∗),
which contradicts equation (A.3).
Proof of statement 2c. Consider the point (X0,S0) with x0 ≡ X0
S0 = ω1 and deﬁne D as the
set of (X,S) for which x < ω1 and from which the consumer can instantaneously move to (X0,S0)
by selling assets from the investment portfolio. Speciﬁcally,
D ≡
(
(X,S) with X < ω1S :
∃ys < 0 for which (1 − θX)X − (1 − ψs)ys = X0 and (1 − θS)S + ys = S0
)
. (A.4)
Deﬁne F as the set of (X,S) for which x ≥ ω1 and to which the consumer can instantaneously
move from any point in D by selling assets from the investment portfolio. Speciﬁcally,
F ≡
(
(X,S) with X ≥ ω1S :
∃ys < 0 for which X = X0 − (1 − ψs)ys and S = S0 + ys ≥ 0
)
. (A.5)
Consider two arbitrary points (X1,S1) and (X2,S2) in set D. Since x1 < ω1 and x2 < ω1, the
optimal value of ys will be strictly negative starting from either point. Moreover, ys must be large
enough in absolute value so that the post-transfer value of (X,S) satisﬁes x ≡ X
S ≥ ω1 because it is
always optimal to sell assets from the investment portfolio from any point in set D. Therefore, the
post-transfer value of (X,S) will be an element of set F. Thus, regardless of whether the consumer
starts from point (X1,S1) or (X2,S2), the consumer’s choice of asset transfer can be described as
choosing (X+,S+) ∈ F to maximize the value function. Therefore, V (X1,S1) = V (X2,S2), so all





dS = −(1 − ψs) 1−θS
1−θX, which proves statement 2c.
Proof of statement 2d. We have shown that if x < ω1, then m(x) = (1 − ψs)
1−θS
1−θX. Using
the expression for the marginal rate of substitution in equation (24) yields the diﬀerential equation
(1 − α)v (x)
v′ (x)
− x = (1 − ψs)
1 − θS
1 − θX




(1 − θX)x + (1 − θS)(1 − ψs)
(1 − θX)ω1 + (1 − θS)(1 − ψs)
￿1−α
v(ω1), for 0 ≤ x ≤ ω1. (A.7)
Proof of statement 1. We start by proving the following Lemma.
22Lemma 3 For suﬃciently small x > 0, 1
1−αe v (x) < 1
1−αv (x) for all x ∈ (0,x).
Proof of Lemma 3. Substitute the expression for U (C (tj,τj)) from equation (12) into the



























Use equation (13) to rewrite the ﬁrst term on the right hand side of equation (A.8) as
￿
1 −



















































Because the choice of C (tj,τj) must satisfy the constraint Xtj − C (tj,τj) ≥ 0, the partial
derivative with respect to C (tj,τj) of the maximand on the right hand side of (A.8) must be
non-negative. Therefore, diﬀerentiation of this maximand with respect to C (tj,τj) yields
￿
1 −
















Since VX () > 0, [h(τj)]
α [C (tj,τj)]
−α > 0, and erLτjβτj > 0, equation (A.11) implies that
1 −







￿ > 0, (A.12)
where φ∗
j and τ∗
j are the values of φj and τj that maximize the restrictive value function. Now we
consider the cases in which α < 1 and α > 1 separately.
Case I: α < 1. When α < 1, equation (A.12) implies a lower bound on τ∗. Use the deﬁnition
of h(τj) in equation (15) to rewrite equation (A.12) as
τ∗
j > τ ≡
1
ω
ln(1 + ωθ1 (1 − α)) > 0. (A.13)










where the inequality follows from the constraint C (tj,τj) ≤ Xtj and the facts that h(τj) is strictly
increasing in τj and τ∗
j > τ. Equation (A.14) implies limXtj→0 ct+
j = 0. Therefore, taking the
23limits of both sides of equation (A.10) as Xtj → 0, and using the facts that 0 ≤ C (tj,τj) ≤ Xtj,
τ∗
j > τ > 0 and limXtj→0
￿
















































Case II: α > 1. In the case with α > 1, ct
+
j does not go to zero as Xtj approaches 0, because the
instantaneous ﬂow of utility would be unboundedly negative. Thus, c ≡ limXtj→0 ct+
j > 0. Hence,
equation (13) implies that limXtj→0 τj = 0. We now that show that c < ∞, i.e., the consumption
ﬂow ct+






θ1 (1 − α)
h(τj) − θ1 (1 − α)e−ωτj
￿
, (A.17)



































, which is ﬁnite. Hence, the left hand side of (A.18) must
also approach a ﬁnite limit. Now suppose (counterfactually) that limXtj→0 ct
+
j = ∞, and re-write










































> 0, and the (counterfactual)
assumption that limXtj→0 ct
+
j = ∞ implies that limXtj→0
C(tj,τj)
h(τj) = ∞ by equation (13). Hence,
the left hand side of (A.18) approaches −∞, so that equation (A.18) cannot hold. Therefore,
limXtj→0 ct
+
j = c < ∞.
Now, taking the limits of both sides of equation (A.10) as Xtj → 0, and using the facts that


























1−αv(0), ∃ x > 0 s.t. 1
1−αe v(x) < 1
1−αv(0) ≤
1
1−αv (x) ∀x ∈ [0,x]. Therefore, ω1 ≥ x > 0.
24Proof of π2 ≥ π1. To prove that π2 ≥ π1, suppose the contrary, i.e., that π1 > π2,
and consider three points (XA,SA), (XB,SB), and (XC,SC), where XA = π1SA, (XB,SB) =
(π1SA − (1 − ψs)z∗,SA + z∗) where z∗ ≡ π1−π2
π2+1−ψsSA, which implies XB = π2SB, (XC,SC) =
(π2SB + (1 + ψb)z∗∗,SB − z∗∗) where z∗∗ ≡ π1−π2
π1+1+ψbSB, which implies XC = π1SC. The deﬁnition
of π1 implies that V (XA,SA) ≥ V (XB,SB) and the deﬁnition of π2 implies that V (XB,SB) ≥













SA > SA, since ψs + ψb > 0. Therefore, since
XC = π1SC and XA = π1SA, we have XC > XA. Hence, since V (X,S) is strictly increasing
in X and S, we have V (XC,SC) > V (XA,SA), which contradicts the earlier statement that
V (XA,SA) ≥ V (XC,SC).
Proof of ω1 ≤ π1. We will prove this statement using a geometric argument to show that
ω1 > π1 leads to a contradiction. We consider three cases: θS < θX, θS > θX, and θS = θX.
Suppose that ω1 > π1 and consider the case in which θS < θX, so that in Figure 2(a) the line
through points B, C, and E, which has slope −(1 − ψs)
1−θS
1−θX, is steeper than the line through
points C and D, which has slope −(1 − ψs). Statement 2c of Proposition 1 implies that for
values of x ≡ X
S less than ω1, indiﬀerence curves of the value function are straight lines with slope
−(1 − ψs) 1−θS
1−θX. Therefore, V (B) = V (C) = V (E), where the notation V (J) indicates the
value of the value function evaluated at point J. The deﬁnition of π1 implies that V (C) ≥ V (D).
Therefore, V (E) ≥ V (D), which contradicts strict monotonicity of the value function since both
X and S are larger at point D than at point E. Therefore, ω1 ≤ π1 if θS < θX.
Suppose that ω1 > π1 and consider the case in which θS > θX, so that in Figure 2(b) the
line through points D and E, which has slope −(1 − ψs)
1−θS
1−θX, is less steep than the line through
points C and E, which has slope −(1 − ψs). Statement 2c of Proposition 1 implies that the line
from point D through point E is an indiﬀerence curve and all points on this indiﬀerence curve are
preferred to all points below and to the left of the indiﬀerence curve for which x < ω1. In particular,
point E is preferred to all points below point E along the line through points E and C. Since the
value of x at point E is higher than π1, the fact that the value function evaluated at point E is
greater than the value function, and hence greater than the restricted value function, evaluated at
all points below point E with slope −(1 − ψs) contradicts the deﬁnition of π1. Therefore, ω1 ≤ π1
if θS > θX.
Suppose that ω1 > π1 and consider the case in which θS = θX, so that in Figure 2(c) the slope
of the line through points C and E is −(1 − ψs)
1−θS
1−θX = −(1 − ψs). Statement 2c of Proposition
1 implies that for values of x ≡ X
S < ω1, indiﬀerence curves of the value function are straight lines
with slope −(1 − ψs)
1−θS
1−θX so points E and C are on the same indiﬀerence curve. Indeed, point E
yields the same value of the value function as all points below point E on the line through points
E and C. That is, for any point J below point E along the line through points E and C with
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Therefore, V (E) = V (J) > e V (J). Since x > π1 at point E, the facts that for arbitrary point J
we have V (E) = V (J) and V (E) > e V (J) contradict the deﬁnition of π1. Therefore, ω1 ≤ π1 if
θS = θX.
Putting together the cases in which θS < θX, θS > θX, and θS = θX, we have proved that
ω1 ≤ π1.
Proof of ω2≥ π2. Use a set of arguments similar to the proof that ω1 ≤ π1.
Proof of ω2< ∞. We will prove that ω2 is ﬁnite by showing that if the investment portfolio has
zero value on an observation date, the consumer will use some of the liquid assets in the transactions
account to buy assets for the investment portfolio. We use proof by contradiction. That is,
suppose that time 0 is an observation date, and that at this observation date, the transactions
account has a balance X0 > 0 and the investment portfolio has a zero balance so that S0 = 0 and
x0 is inﬁnite. Suppose that whenever the investment portfolio has zero value on an observation
date, the consumer does not transfer any assets to the investment portfolio. Then the consumer
will simply consume from the transactions account over the inﬁnite future, never incurring any
observation costs or transactions costs. In this case, with the values of the variables denoted with
26asterisks, c∗
0+ = X0




























Now consider an alternative feasible path that sets ct = c∗
t for 0 < t ≤ T and at time 0+
transfers to the investment portfolio any liquid assets in the transactions account that will not be
needed to ﬁnance consumption until time T. Under this alternative policy, the present value of
consumption up to date T is h(T)c∗
0+ = h(T)ωX0, so
X0+ = h(T)ωX0. (A.20)
The consumer uses (1 − θX − ωh(T))X0 liquid assets to purchase assets in the investment port-
folio. After paying the transactions cost,
S0+ =
1 − θX − ωh(T)
1 + ψb
X0. (A.21)
Suppose that the consumer invests the investment portfolio entirely in the riskless bond. At
time T, the transactions account has a zero balance, and the investment portfolio is worth ST =
exp(rfT)
1−θX−ωh(T)
1+ψb X0. The consumer converts the entire investment portfolio to the liquid
asset in the transactions account, so that after paying the transactions costs, the balance in the
transactions account is
XT+ = (1 − θS)
1 − ψs
1 + ψb




T as the ratio of the transactions account balance at time T+ under this alterna-








X0, along with ω ≡
ρ−(1−α)rL










F (T) ≡ exp[(rf − rL)T][1 − θX exp(ωT)]. (A.24)







θX < 1, (A.25)
where the inequality follows from the assumption that θX < θX in equation (29) and the fact that
ω















27Use equation (A.25) and the deﬁnition of h(T) to obtain
























Substitute equations (A.20) and (A.22) into equation (A.28) and use the facts that h(∞) = 1
ω































Now divide the utility under the alternative plan in equation (A.29) by utility under the initial
plan in equation (A.19) and use the deﬁnition of ω to obtain
U








Use the fact that ωh(T) = 1 − exp(−ωT) to rewrite equation (A.30) as
U







− 1 − θ1 (1 − α)ω
!
exp(−ωT). (A.31)
If α < 1, utility under the alternative plan, U, will exceed U∗ if U
U∗ > 1; if α > 1, utility
under the alternative plan, U, will exceed U∗ if U
U∗ < 1. A suﬃcient condition for U to exceed U∗,







[1 + θ1 (1 − α)ω]
1
1−α . (A.32)




X , the condition in equation (A.32) will be
























28which is equivalent to θX < θX in equation (29). Since θX < θX, the original plan, in which the
consumer does not buy any assets in the investment portfolio, is not optimal.
The proof of statement 1 is now complete








so that xtj = ω1. The proof of statement 2b implies that if the consumer sells assets













j = π1 ≥ ω1,






(1 − θX)ω1 + (1 − θS)(1 − ψs)
π1 + 1 − ψs
. (A.34)
The value-matching condition states that the consumer is indiﬀerent between the initial allocation
with xtj = ω1 and the new allocation with xt
+














Use equation (22), which is based on the homogeneity of the value function, to obtain
S1−α





Divide both sides of equation (A.36) by S1−α
tj and use equation (A.34) to obtain
v(ω1) =
￿
(1 − θX)ω1 + (1 − θS)(1 − ψs)
π1 + 1 − ψs
￿1−α
v(π1). (A.37)
Observe from equation (A.37) that if θX = θS = 0, then ω1 = π1. In this case, π1 is both a trigger
value and a return value. That is, if xtj < π1 on observation date tj, the consumer will sell assets
from the investment portfolio to make xt+
j = π1.
Proof of statements 4 and 5. The proof of statement 4 follows the proof of statement 2,
and the proof of statement 5 follows the proof of statement 3.
The proof of Proposition 1 is now complete.
Proof of Proposition 2. Proof by contradiction. Since θ1 > 0, the consumer will not
continuously observe the value of the investment portfolio. That is τj > 0. If xtj < ω1 on an
observation date tj, then the consumer sells assets from the investment portfolio, increasing Xtj
and decreasing Stj until xt
+
j = π1. The consumer chooses τj and C(tj,τj), which is the present
value of consumption between times t+
j and tj+1 = tj + τj. Suppose that the consumer chooses
C (tj,τj) < Xt+
j , which implies Xtj+1 =
h
Xt+
j − C (tj,τj)
i
erLτj > 0. We will show that there exists
a deviation from this choice that will increase the consumer’s expected lifetime utility, and hence
Xtj+1 > 0 cannot be optimal.
Consider a deviation in which the consumer reduces the amount of assets that she sells from









1−ψs and invests this amount in the
29riskless bond. With this deviation, the value of the investment portfolio at time tj+1 will exceed
its value under the original policy by
Xtj+1
1−ψs e(rf−rL)τj and the transactions account will have a zero
balance at time tj+1.
The deviation from the original path will take one of two forms at time t+
j+1, depending on
whether the consumer would transfer assets under the original plan at time t+
j+1. First, consider
the case in which the consumer transfers assets at time t+
j+1. In this case, the consumer can
sell the additional
Xtj+1
1−ψs e(rf−rL)τj in the investment portfolio to obtain additional liquid assets







. However, since the consumer would have transferred assets under the
original plan, she would have had to incur a ﬁxed cost equal to θXXtj+1+θSStj+1. Therefore the net



















e(rf−rL)τj − 1 + θX
i












Xtj+1 > 0, and the net
gain of the deviation is positive.
Now consider the case in which the consumer would not make any transfers between investment
portfolio and the transactions account at time t+
j+1 under the original policy, which implies that
ω1 ≤ xtj+1 ≤ ω2. In this case, instead of selling the additional
Xtj+1
1−ψs e(rf−rL)τj assets in the







the investment portfolio at time t+
j+1. We observe that if θS is small enough, then z > 0. Moreover,
by construction of z, the consumer has the same value of assets in the investment portfolio under







Hence, the consumer will prefer the deviation if z (1 − ψs) > Xt
+
j+1 = Xtj+1. Using the deﬁnition
of z, the consumer will prefer the deviation if (1 − θS)Xtj+1e(rf−rL)τj − θS (1 − ψs)Stj+1 > Xtj+1,
which is equivalent to (1 − θS)e(rf−rL)τj −
θS(1−ψs)
xtj+1
> 1. Since (rf −rL)τj > 0 and xtj+1 ≥ ω1 > 0,
limθS→0
h




> 1. Therefore, for suﬃciently small θS, the consumer
prefers the deviation.
We have shown that if xtj < ω1, then xtj+1 = 0 < ω1. Therefore, xtj+2 = 0 and so on, ad
inﬁnitum.
Proof of Lemma 1. Lemma 4 states that the optimal value of φj is positive. Since
τj > 0 as a consequence of the observation cost, there exists some δ > 0 such that between



































−rLτjR(τj) (where the ﬁnal inequality




≥ δ. Let tk ≥ tj be the ﬁrst observation date at which
xtk < ω1. Then by Williams (1991), p. 233, Pr{tk < ∞} = 1 and E {tk} < ∞.
Proof of Proposition 4. Suppose that ψs = 0 and let {S∗
t }
t=∞
t=tj be the path of the St under
30the optimal policy starting from observation date tj when the consumer observes Xtj = 0 and
Stj = S∗
tj. Let τ∗ be the constant optimal interval of time between consecutive observations so that
observation date tk = tj +(k − j)τ∗, for k ≥ j. For any observation date tk ≥ tj, the transactions
account balance will be Xtk = 0, and immediately after each observation date the transactions










. Since 0 = X∗












Now let ψs take an arbitrary admissible and suppose that the consumer continues to observe
the value of the investment portfolio on dates tk = tj + (k − j)τ∗, for k ≥ j, and maintains the
same path of St, i.e., that St = S∗
t for t ≥ tj. Since the consumer will make the same transfers
out of the investment portfolio as in the initial case with ψs = 0, a feasible path of the transaction
account balance immediately after each observation date would be Xt
+
























































(statement 1). We showed
that by maintaining the same observation dates when ψs is positive as when ψs = 0 allows a path














by maintaining the same observation dates when ψs = 0 as when ψs is positive allows a path


















we have proven statement 2. For any observation date tk ≥ tj, xt
+















= (1 − ψs)π1 (0), which proves statement 3.
Proof of Proposition 5. At each observation date tj the consumer chooses the share





















j φj + ξjSt+
j (1 − φj) (A.38)
where δjSt
+
j ≥ 0 is the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint φj ≥ 0 and ξjSt
+
j ≥ 0 is the Lagrange
multiplier on the constraint φj ≤ 1. Diﬀerentiating the Lagrangian in equation (A.38) with respect














= ξj − δj. (A.39)
Next, we prove the following lemma.
Lemma 4 φj > 0 and δj = 0.
31Proof of Lemma 4. We will proceed by contradiction. Suppose that φj = 0, which





















positive. Therefore, φj must be positive, which implies δj = 0.




, by a function
















































, the increase in expected lifetime utility made possible by a











θX dollars in C (tj+1,τj+1). That is, if consumer transfers assets
between the investment portfolio and the transactions account at time t+
j+1, a one-dollar increase
in Xtj+1 would allow C (tj+1,τj+1) to increase by 1 − θX dollars; otherwise, C (tj+1,τj+1) can
increase by one dollar. Substitute equation (A.41) into equation (A.40) and use the expression for




































in equation (A.39) and


































In standard models without observation costs and transfer costs, and without the constraints 0 ≤










= 0 for s > t. (A.44)
In general, the Euler equation in the presence of observation costs and transactions costs in
equation (A.43) diﬀers from the standard Euler equation in equation (A.44) in three ways: (1)
the Euler equation in equation (A.43) contains the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint φj ≤
321 but this Lagrange multiplier does not appear in the standard Euler equation; (2) the Euler




, which is a random
variable, but this marginal rate of substitution is absent (or implicitly equal to a constant) in









θX, which reﬂects the additional ﬁxed transfer cost associated with
having an additional dollar in the transactions account; (4) the Euler equation in equation (A.43)
contains the term 1−
θ1(1−α)
e
ωτjh(τj+1), which reﬂects the utility cost of the next observation; and (5) in the
presence of observation costs, the Euler equation holds only for rates of return between observation
dates, whereas the Euler equation in the standard case holds for rates of return between any
arbitrary pair of dates because all dates are observation dates in the standard case. We show that
in the long run in an interesting special case, the ﬁrst four of these diﬀerences disappear. Before
showing this result, we prove the following lemma.
Lemma 5 Suppose that θX and θS are suﬃciently small, in the sense described in the proof of
Proposition 2. If xtj ≤ ω1, then (i) φj < 1 if α >
µ−rf
σ2 and (ii) φj = 1 if α ≤
µ−rf
σ2 .
Proof of Lemma 5. Proposition 2 implies that if xtj ≤ π1, then xtj+1 = 0. The optimal












, which is equiv-






+ (1 − φj)erfτj
i1−α￿
. Deﬁne α∗ such that
argmaxφj ϕ(φj;α∗) = 1 and note that ϕ′ (1;α∗) = 0.
Diﬀerentiating the deﬁnition of ϕ(φj;α) with respect to φj and setting φj = 1 yields











Use the fact that
Ptj+τj
Ptj
is lognormal to obtain
























ϕ′ (1;α) = exp
￿￿















ϕ′ (1;α) ⋚ 0 as α   α∗ ≡ (µ − rf)/σ2.
Diﬀerentiate ϕ(φj;α) twice with respect to φj to obtain












33which implies that ϕ(φj;α) is concave. If α > α∗, then ϕ′ (1;α) < 0, so the concavity of ϕ(φj;α)
implies that the optimal value of φj is less than one and the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint
φj ≤ 1 is ξj = 0. If α ≤ α∗, then ϕ′ (1;α) ≥ 0, so the concavity of ϕ(φj;α) implies that the
optimal value of φj equals one. If α < α∗, the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint φj ≤ 1 is
ξj > 0.
Suppose that θX and θS are suﬃciently small so that in the long run, the stochastic process
for xtj is absorbed at zero. Lemma 5 implies that if the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion α
exceeds
µ−rf
σ2 , then in the long run the constraint φj ≤ 1 does not bind, and hence ξj = 0. In
this case, the ﬁrst of the ﬁve diﬀerences between the Euler equation in equation (A.43) and the
standard Euler equation disappears. In addition, in the long run xtj = 0 on each observation




= (1 − ψs)
1−θS
1−θX on each observation date, (2) the consumer sells assets















ωτjh(τj+1) is constant. Using the fact that ξj = 0 and dividing both sides of equation (A.43)






, proves proposition 5.
34Notes
1Stokey (2009) presents a comprehensive analysis of issues related to inaction and infrequent adjustment.
2We call this cost the “observation cost,” though it summarizes all costs associated with obtaining and
processing the information necessary to choose consumption and the allocation of assets.
3Woodford (2008) applies the concept of rational inattention in the context of pricing behavior by ﬁrms.
4Reis (2006) develops and analyzes a model of optimal inattention for a consumer who faces a cost of
observing additive income, such as labor income. In that model, the consumer can hold only a single riskless
asset so there is no portfolio allocation problem.
5Gabaix and Laibson (2002) is very similar to Abel, Eberly, and Panageas (2007), except that Gabaix
and Laibson model the cost of observing the stock market as a utility cost and Abel, Eberly, and Panageas
model it as a resource cost. A more important diﬀerence, however, is that the formulation of this cost used
by Abel, Eberly, and Panageas preserves the homogeneity of the value function in wealth, thereby permitting
exact analytic solution of the value function. However, the formulation adopted by Gabaix and Laibson does
not preserve this homogeneity. (In private correspondence, Gabaix and Laibson (November 25, 2006) clarify
their observation cost by stating ”that the utility cost is always qw0e−ρt, not qwte−ρt,” so that the cost
is not proportional to the contemporaneous value of wealth.) Therefore, Gabaix and Laibson compute an
approximate solution.
6Huang and Liu (2007) apply the concept of rational inattention to study the optimal portfolio decision
of an investor who can obtain costly noisy signals about a state variable governing the expected growth
rate of stock prices. Although the substantive topic of their application of rational inattention is very
close to the topic of our current paper, the economic framework is quite diﬀerent. Importantly, Huang and
Liu do not impose a cash-in-advance constraint that requires consumption to be purchased with a liquid
asset. As a consequence, they focus on the investment portfolio of risky equity and bonds, but do not have
a transactions account, whereas our focus is on the transfers of assets between the investment portfolio
and the transactions account. In addition, Huang and Liu do not include any costs of trading assets and
they allow continuous observation of stock prices so that the investor continuously trades assets within the
investment portfolio. However, our modeling of transfer costs and infrequent observation of stock prices
leads to infrequent transfers of assets.
7Our earlier paper assumes that the investment portfolio is continuously re-balanced by a portfolio man-
ager who, on each observation date, charges a fee proportional to the size of the portfolio (and thus the fee is
not separately identiﬁable from an observation cost that is proportional to the size of the portfolio) whereas
the current paper does not allow re-balancing of the investment portfolio between observation dates.
8Because the transactions account does not include any risky assets, the consumer continuously knows
the value of Xt.
9The consumer does not observe any new information between time t
+
j and time tj+1 and hence cannot
adjust the portfolio in response to any news that arrives during this interval of inattention. It is possible
that the consumer could decide at time t
+
j to exchange equity for bonds at some time(s) before tj+1, but
we do not consider this possibility in this paper. In Abel, Eberly, and Panageas (2007) a portfolio manager
continuously rebalances equity and bonds in the investment portfolio.
10This interpretation of ψs as a tax rate is most plausible if the consumer only withdraws money from the
investment portfolio and never transfers assets into the investment portfolio. As we will see in Section 3,
the long run is characterized by precisely this situation in which the consumer never transfers funds into the
35investment portfolio, if the ﬁxed component of the transfer cost is suﬃciently small.
11We assume that θX is very small so that if X > 0 and S = 0, the consumer will not be deterred from
transferring at least some assets from the transactions account to the investment portfolio. We assume that
ψs +θS < 1 to prevent assets from becoming ”trapped” in the investment portfolio if the consumer were to
try to sell assets from the investment portfolio at a time when X = 0. If, instead, ψs + θS were greater
than or equal to one, then an attempt to sell a dollar of assets from the investment portfolio would cost at
least one dollar and the consumer would not receive any liquid assets as a result of this transaction.
12Duﬃe and Sun (1990) assume that on each observation date the consumer pays a portfolio management
fee that is proportional to total wealth. In their model, optimal behavior implies that X = 0 on each
observation date, so the ﬁxed transaction cost θXX + θSS is simply θSS; hence, they do not need to
explicitly specify the value of θX.
13As we will show, if Stj = 0 on observation date tj, the consumer will use some liquid assets from the
transactions account to purchase assets in the investment portfolio, so St
+
j > 0. Then on all subsequent
observation dates, Stj > 0.
14The optimal values of consumption during the interval of time from t
+
j to tj+1 satisfy the condition that













and the gross rate of return between those times, e
rL(s−t
+








j , for t
+
j ≤ s ≤ tj+1. (*)
Substituting cs from equation (*) into equation (10) in the text yields
C (tj,τj) = h(τj)ct
+
j , (**)







j )C (tj,τj), for t
+
j ≤ s ≤ tj+1. (***)
Substituting equation (***) into equation (11), and using the deﬁnition of h(τj) in equation (15) yields
U (C (tj,τj)) = 1
1−α [h(τj)]
α [C (tj,τj)]







15King, Plosser, and Rebelo (1988) have shown that this speciﬁcation of the utility function is the only
speciﬁcation in a real business cycle model that is consistent with the empirically observed stationarity of
hours worked together with nonstationary consumption.
16To see that V (X,S) > e V (X,S) in Region I, use the fact that V (X,S) is strictly increasing in X and
S to obtain V K > V A = V B = e V B = e V K, where V i is the value of V (X,S) at point i and e V j is the value
of e V (X,S) at point j in the ﬁgure.
17If we relax the assumption that θX = θS, then statement 2c of Proposition 1 implies that the slope of
the linear portion of the indiﬀerence curve through points B and A is −(1 − ψs) 1−θS
1−θX while the slope of the
dashed line through points C, B′, and A′ remains −(1 − ψs). The horizontal intercept of the indiﬀerence
curve, S, is 1
1−θS ≥ 1 times as large as S, the horizontal intercept of the dashed line through points C,












. Therefore, even if θX > θS, so that the linear portion of the indiﬀerence curve
36slopes downward more steeply than the dashed line, the linear portion of the indiﬀerence curve will not cross
the dashed line for any non-negative values of X. Also, statement 4c of Proposition 1 implies that the
slope of the indiﬀerence curve through points E and F is −(1 + ψb) 1−θS
1−θX . The vertical intercept of the
indiﬀerence curve is 1
1−θX ≥ 1 times as large as the vertical intercept of the dashed line through point D
and thus the indiﬀerence curve does not cross this dashed line for non-negative values of S.
18In order to obtain the dollar equivalent cost, we use the fact that a utility cost of θ1c
1−α
tj+1 is equivalent









tj+1. Solving for λ gives λ =
1− [1 − (1 − α)θ1]
1





of the value of the investment portfolio. Hence for a consumer who has 106 dollars in




106. This is the number reported in the second column of Table 1.
19Eberly (1994) shows that a version of the consumption Euler equation also holds in a model with a ﬁxed
cost of adjusting the stock of durables, by considering consumption at consecutive adjustment dates.
20It is worth noting that “suﬃciently risk-averse” need not require a very high value of α. For instance,
if the expected equity premium is µ − rf = 0.04 and and the standard deviation of the rate of return on
equity is σ = 0.16, then any value of α greater than 1.5625 will be suﬃciently risk averse.
21Recent work by Yuan (2008) has documented that investors appear to react to news that the stock
market has reached a new peak.
22Let D be the partial derivative of the ﬁrst term on the right hand side of equation (A.8) with respect to






























θ1 (1 − α)
h(τj) − θ1 (1 − α)e−ωτj + α
￿￿
1 −

























= 1 at all observation dates, and hence can be eliminated from equation (A.43).
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